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Abstract  
The UK health service, which had been diagnosed to be seriously out of step with good design practice, has been 
recommended to obtain knowledge of design and risk management practice from other safety-critical industries. 
While these other industries have benefited from a broad range of systems modelling approaches, healthcare remains 
a long way behind. In order to investigate the healthcare-specific applicability of systems modelling approaches, this 
study identified ten distinct methods through meta-model analysis. We then evaluated healthcare workers’ perception 
on ‘ease of use’ and ‘usefulness.’ 
The characterisation of the systems modelling methods showed that each method had particular capabilities to 
describe specific aspects of a complex system. However, the healthcare workers found that some of the methods, 
although potentially very useful, would be difficult to understand, particularly without prior experience. This study 
provides valuable insights into a better use of the systems modelling methods in healthcare. 
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Statement indicating the relevance of the findings for ergonomics practice 
The findings in this study provide insights into how to make a better use of various systems modelling approaches to 
the design and risk management of healthcare delivery systems, which have been a growing research interest among 
ergonomists and human factor professionals.
 1. Introduction 
Healthcare is a highly pressured, complex and diverse system, where the potential for error and accidents is 
ever present. Ensuring the safety of patients has become one of the most important challenges facing 
healthcare especially since the publication of a report, "To Err is Human" by the Institute of Medicine (Kohn 
et al. 2000). In this report, medical errors in hospitals were estimated to be the seventh leading cause of death 
(44,000 ~ 98,000 deaths per year) in the United States, and rank higher than motor vehicle accidents, breast 
cancer or AIDS (Kohn et al. 2000). In many other countries, including the UK, it was suggested that adverse 
events, in which harm is caused to patients, occur in around 10% of admissions (DH 2000). 
In response to these problems, healthcare, which had been diagnosed to be seriously out of step with 
modern systems thinking and good design practice (Clarkson et al. 2004), began to adopt safety approaches 
from other safety-critical industries, where effective design and risk management are well established (DH 
2001, Clarkson et al. 2004, Reid et al. 2005). These industries include the aviation, nuclear power and 
chemical industries where good systems engineering and human factors practices have been adopted to design 
a safe system and operate it safely. One aspect of attention to systems design for safety is risk management, 
which has been widely and successfully applied in many safety critical industries. 
Risk management usually begins with defining the scope of a system and describing its intended 
behaviour. Next, the hazards in the system are identified and their associated risks analysed and prioritised. 
Finally, new design concepts are generated to eliminate high risk elements. Various techniques for hazard 
identification and risk analysis have been developed and used to meet different needs for different industries 
and situations. These techniques include Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard and Operability 
Studies (HAZOP), Human Error Analysis (HEA) and barrier analysis, just to name a few. 
Whatever the choice of risk analysis technique, many other industries noticed that having a clear 
system understanding is an essential prerequisite for thorough and effective risk analysis (Redmill et al. 1999). 
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They have tried to make the most of a broad range of systems modelling methods (methods of diagrammatic 
description of systems, which in this paper we also call ‘diagram types’) and utilised ones suitable for their 
application areas. Some examples are listed below: 
• Process flowcharts and block diagrams for analysing hazards throughout the product's life cycle using 
FMEA (DYADEM 2003); 
• Piping & instrumentation diagrams, process flowcharts, utility flow diagrams and layout drawing for 
analysing risks in chemical processes using HAZOP (Hyatt 2003); 
• Context diagrams and data flow diagrams for identifying hazards in a semi-automated technical system 
using HAZOP (Redmill et al. 1999); 
• Hierarchical task analysis and state space diagrams for identifying errors in the use of consumer products 
using SHERPA (Stanton and Baber 2005). 
 
Although risk management has gained growing acceptance in a number of clinical areas over the past 
few years (DeRosier et al. 2002, Lyons et al. 2004, Esmail et al. 2005, Sheridan-Leos et al. 2006, van Tilburg 
et al. 2006), a very limited range of diagram types – i.e. mostly hierarchical task analysis or flowcharts – has 
been used. A few other types of diagrams, such as sequence diagrams or swim lane activity diagrams, have 
been tried in healthcare (Middleton and Roberts 2000, Pradhan et al. 2001, Beuscart-Zephir et al. 2007), but 
only in isolated situations and without overall consideration of alternative systems modelling methods. 
The need has been articulated for better application of systems modelling to healthcare (Clarkson et al. 
2004, Edwards 2005), given the diversity and complexity of the healthcare system. Some care processes 
involve cross-organisational team working with multiple stakeholders along with complex transfers of 
information, medication and patients, whereas others involve only a few individuals performing relatively 
simple tasks. Some care processes involve interactions with complex, advanced technology, whereas others 
involve only human-to-human interactions. The diverse attributes of these care processes, consisting of tasks, 
technology, information, individuals and teams, contribute to the introduction of patient safety incidents in a 
variety of  ways (Vincent et al. 1998).  
In spite of the potential benefits of using systems modelling methods for a better understanding of care 
processes, no evidence was found of a range of methods being systematically applied in healthcare. We 
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believe that a primary reason for the lack of use of systems modelling methods in healthcare is a dearth of 
knowledge of what methods are available and how they differ from each other. Secondly, and more 
importantly, healthcare workers might require a particular balance between practicality and utility of systems 
modelling methods; modelling approaches are unfamiliar to the majority of healthcare workers (Harper and 
Pitt 2004) and therefore they are less likely to possess the skills necessary to develop models in contrast to the 
availability of such skills in many other industrial sectors.  
Deciding what models to use are often characterised as an art rather than science. It has been widely 
recognised that deciding what modelling methods best suit ‘users’ needs’ requires the skilful balance of 
benefits and costs (Chahed et al. 2006, Davis 2008). A degree of experimentation with users has been 
suggested to be necessary to identify their needs (Davis 2008), but this has not been carried out in the 
healthcare context. 
Thus, the objective of this study is twofold. The first is to explore and characterise various systems 
modelling methods so that we can identify a broad range of distinct systems modelling methods for healthcare 
application. The second is to evaluate how healthcare workers perceive ‘ease of use’ and ‘usefulness’ of such 
methods so that we can gain some insight into how to better use available methods in support of risk 
management in healthcare. 
The next section presents the research approach followed for developing a systems modelling method 
characterisation framework and evaluating each method. This is then followed by a detailed description of the 
results. The paper then ends with a discussion of the insight gained from the study. 
2. Research approach 
The approaches employed throughout this research draw upon a number of the methodological stages. The 
first stage comprises an exploratory study about model usage in healthcare and other safety critical industries 
through a literature review and interviews with healthcare workers. The second stage comprises three case 
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studies in which each of three different care scenarios was modelled using different diagram types. The third 
stage is an evaluation, during which healthcare workers’ perception on the ‘ease of understanding’ and 
‘usefulness’ were assessed using interview-based questionnaire. The details of each stage follow. 
2.1. Exploratory stage - literature review and unstructured interviews 
The objective of this stage was to investigate the usage of systems modelling methods in healthcare and other 
industries. Literature review process was employed to understand the current systems modelling practices 
reported to be used in healthcare and to explore a variety of systems modelling methods developed and 
applied in other industries. In addition, one-hour unstructured interviews were carried out with three clinical 
risk managers and one service improvement manager from Cambridgeshire hospitals and a clinical risk 
manager from the Cambridgeshire Primary Care Trust to investigate the current usage of systems modelling 
methods in healthcare. The scope of the review included not only the use of diagram types in conjunction with 
risk analysis, but also the use of general purpose diagram types from various disciplines, e.g. software 
engineering, systems engineering, ergonomics, business process modelling, operations management, etc.  
Multiple literature search strategies were employed to explore across a number of disciplinary 
boundaries. This included searching electronic databases (PubMed, Web of Knowledge), grey literature, 
multiple websites (Google / Google Scholar) and published books from a range of disciplines and sectors. The 
initial search of the above corpus was driven by combinations of keywords, including all variants of different 
spellings, grammatical forms and synonyms: for example (Modelling OR Modeling OR Mapping) AND 
(System OR Process). Other key words, such as (Healthcare OR Health Care) and Safety, were optionally 
used to narrow down the results. A great number of journal articles on mathematical modelling were excluded 
since conceptual models, i.e. diagrammatic representations, were the prime concern of this study. The 
reference trails from the initially-identified materials were also followed. 
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One of the challenges of this review was in dealing with so many variations and extensions of 
modelling methods. For example, the Yourdon Structured Method (YSM), one of the software engineering 
modelling methods, had moved progressively through four different versions over 15 years since its launch 
1981 (Topper et al. 1994). The first version of the Yourdon technique was based on function-based modelling. 
This was followed by event-based models and state-based models and the current version includes object-
oriented models. Moreover, a great number of domain-specific variations from such primary progression have 
been developed. 
In order to overcome these challenges it was decided to keep the literature search focusing on 
‘primary’ and ‘general-purpose’ modelling methods rather than domain-specifically developed modelling 
variations. For example, whilst journals tended to describe a great number of methods adapted for specific 
purposes and domains, published books were more helpful in getting an overall view on primary methods. 
2.2. Prescriptive stage – case studies 
2.2.1. Method characterisation framework development – Meta model analysis 
In order to identify limited but distinctive modelling methods for healthcare application, the systems 
modelling methods reviewed from the literature were characterised and categorised using meta-models, i.e. a 
model of the model, which refer to: modelling elements (nodes and links); how they are constructed; and how 
they relate to one another. This study extended the meta-model analysis, which Holt (2004) used to compare 
different diagram types of the Unified Modeling Language (UML), to a broader range of modelling methods 
including Structured Analysis and Design (SA/SD) and Integrated Definitions (IDEF) methods. Accordingly, 
a method characterisation framework was developed to describe ten different diagram types and compare 
them in a clear and structured manner. 
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2.2.2. Method application to healthcare – Case studies 
A case study approach was chosen to develop detailed and intensive knowledge about systems modelling 
applications in the context of a small number of healthcare scenarios. Three case studies were chosen from the 
authors’ network of contacts. We attempted to find care processes which had system-level interactions 
between different departments, since transfer of care (inter- or intra-facility transfer of patients) is more likely 
to pose potential risks for patient safety (Forster et al. 2003, Harrison et al. 2005) and be more worthy of 
study. However, more importantly, case studies had to be of interest to healthcare practitioners if they were to 
engage with them. Under these limitations, the following three cases were selected: 
Case Study 1: A patient discharge process from a medical ward; 
Case Study 2: A diabetic patient care process in a GP practice; 
Case Study 3: A prostate cancer diagnosis process in a hospital. 
 
Case Study 1 covers both intra- and inter-facility transfers (between a pharmacy, a ward and patient’s 
home). Case Study 2 covers inter-facility transfer (between a GP surgery and a hospital). Case Study 3 
consists of intra-facility transfer (between a clinical department and a ward). 
In all cases, process information collection and modelling were carried out iteratively. Information was 
gathered about how the care process works, primarily through the interviews with key healthcare workers, and 
complementarily using informal observation and documentary analysis.  The interviews for each case study 
consisted mostly of three to four one-hour sessions with different interviewees or multiple sessions with the 
same interviewees. Generally, after the first interview, it was possible to draft basic system models. These 
models were used as inputs to the following interviews, and were verified and completed step-by-step through 
iterative information collection and modelling cycles. The semantic consistency between different diagram 
types was repeatedly maintained and checked by the interviewees. 
Before or during the interviews, national or local policy documents were identified and collected. 
These documents assisted the learning of new terminology and the building of high-level general system 
models. For Case Study 1 only, observations were additionally carried out by attending two multidisciplinary 
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team meetings and shadowing two pharmacists on their ward-rounds. The observations helped to give a direct 
and detailed understanding of the specific individual activities. This approach, though valuable, was not 
feasible for all three case studies owing to the research sites’ different commitments to and positions on 
patients’ privacy. Both Microsoft Visio and Adobe Illustrator were used as diagramming tools.  
The case studies took place in Cambridge, UK with approval from the Cambridge Local Research 
Ethics Committee. 
2.3 Evaluation stage – interview-based questionnaire 
After generating three sets of ten system models, healthcare workers’ perceived ‘ease of use’ and ‘usefulness’ 
of their models were evaluated through the following criteria and procedure. 
2.3.1. Evaluation criteria 
This study had the challenges involved in accessing healthcare workers, which meant that the evaluation of 
ten different conditions (ten different types of diagrams) often had to be done within one hour. Based on the 
Technology Acceptance Model (Davis 1989), we evaluate their perceived ‘ease of use’ and ‘usefulness’ by 
scale-based questionnaire and open-ended feedback. 
This approach, which represents the most widely applied model of user acceptance and usage of 
information technologies, suggests that two specific beliefs – perceived ‘ease of use’ and perceived 
‘usefulness’ – determine one’s behavioural intention to use a technology, in this study modelling method 
acceptance by healthcare workers. 
2.3.3. Questionnaire building 
The following five statements were generated to evaluate the ‘ease of use’ and ‘usefulness’ of each diagram.  
I.  This diagram is easily understandable. 
II.  This diagram is helpful in better understanding and communicating how the system works. 
III. This diagram is helpful in identifying and analysing task-related hazards.   
IV. This diagram is helpful in identifying and analysing human resource-related hazards. 
V.  This diagram is helpful in identifying and analysing information/material-related hazards. 
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‘Ease of understanding’, which is a fundamental attribute of ‘ease of use’ for conceptual models, was captured 
in Statement I. ‘Usefulness’ was measured by different types of ‘usefulness’, capturing not only general 
‘usefulness’ for system understanding and communication (Statement II), but also more specific ‘usefulness’ 
for identifying and analysing specific hazard types, such as task, human resource and information/material 
(Statement III, IV and V). The participants were asked to indicate their (dis)agreement with each statement on 
a five-point scale (strongly disagree; disagree; neither agree nor disagree; agree; strongly agree). 
In Statements III, IV and V, the three types of hazards were defined in consideration of safety-related 
issues in healthcare. In general, the majority of healthcare activities are based on human tasks, which are the 
main concern of most human error analysis methods. On the other hand, system-level issues relating to 
information and human resources are also of great concern to healthcare, e.g. wrong/delayed information 
transfer and unclear responsibilities (Wilson et al. 2005, Riley et al. 2006, Glintborg et al. 2007). The 
importance of these system-level issues was also found in this study during the interviews with healthcare 
managers. A senior manager in a local hospital emphasised the existence of potential hazards in the provision 
of human resources in the following comment. 
Human resource is the biggest problem we face at the moment. If key persons are off sick, a whole process seems to 
be founded on a key individual. You can not dictate it or control it. The NHS does not have resilience or redundancy 
built into human resource to cover every single key task.  
 
A risk manager in another local hospital commented on potential hazards of information transfer.  
We had communication problems all the time. It was a breakdown in communication that causes the whole process to 
go wrong. However, we could not see how it went wrong. 
2.3.4. Recruiting participants 
In total, 29 participants were recruited for the diagram evaluation: seven clinical staff (2 general practitioners, 
2 nurses, 2 pharmacists and 1 occupational therapist), fifteen healthcare managers (8 service improvement 
managers, 2 risk managers, 2 discharge managers and 2 general mangers) and seven healthcare researchers (2 
psychologists, 2 pharmacists, 2 engineers and 1 ergonomist). Seventeen responses were obtained from Case 
Study 1 and six responses were gained from each of the other two case studies. All participants answered 
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Statement I, but one participant was not able to finish answering Statement II owing to an unscheduled patient 
visit. Eighteen participants answered Statements III∼V, since these statements were included part way through 
the study. 
2.3.5. Evaluation procedure 
Evaluation sessions took one and half hours on average and a maximum of two and half hours (depending on 
the participants’ willingness to stay on). At the beginning of each evaluation session, each diagram was 
presented and explained to the participant for 15∼20 minutes. 
At the beginning of the questionnaire, each participant was asked to fill in background information 
such as their job type, period of time working in healthcare and previous experience with the diagrams (in 
terms of whether they had used and/or generated such diagrams). In Case Study 1, which partially acted as a 
pilot study, the questionnaire was carried out in two different ways: self-completion and interview. We 
learned that the interview-based questionnaire was very effective in capturing rich qualitative feedback, so 
this approach was used throughout Case Studies 2 and 3. The participants’ qualitative feedback on each 
diagram, i.e. why do you (dis)agree with the statements, was audio-recorded. 
2.3.6. Analysis 
First, a (3×10) mixed ANOVA (case study×diagram types) was used to investigate the effect of the case study 
on the response patterns; where the five levels of agreement (from strongly disagree to strongly agree) were 
represented by five response scales (one to five). Across the three case studies, the percentage agreement with 
each of the five statements – i.e. how many percent of the participants agreed to the statements – was analysed 
to investigate the overall response patterns, followed by the analysis of the qualitative feedback to interpret 
the rationale behind the patterns. In addition, the participants’ prior experience with the five groups of 
diagram types (similar diagram types were grouped together for convenience and will be further explained in 
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Table 3) was initially analysed to investigate the participants’ diagram experience profile referenced to their 
job types.  
3. Results 
3.1. Systems modelling methods in healthcare and other industries 
The literature review showed that healthcare has heavily relied on flowcharts (DeRosier et al. 2002, Esmail et 
al. 2005, Sheridan-Leos et al. 2006, NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement 2007)with limited 
understanding of various alternative systems modelling methods. The findings from the interviews with the 
four clinical risk managers showed that the use of systems modelling methods for risk management was even 
more limited. Their risk management efforts mainly focused on analysing adverse incidents reactively rather 
than doing proactive risk assessment. The interview with the service improvement manager rather showed that 
flowcharts have been dominantly used for general service quality improvement. 
Conversely, other safety-critical industries have proactively managed risk and extensively applied 
diverse modelling methods developed for use by various disciplines. For example, human factors specialists 
have used a large set of task-analysis methods with a special interest in understanding interactions between 
physical devices and individual behaviour. These methods include input-output diagrams, process charts, 
functional flow diagrams, information flow charts, etc (Kirwan and Ainsworth 1992). In the field of 
management science, many process models have been developed to improve business processes on their own 
or in conjunction with simulation techniques. These methods include process maps, activity cycle diagrams, 
stock flow diagrams, etc (Pidd 2003, Bozarth and Handfield 2005). 
Since the 1970s, software and systems engineers have developed many types of modelling languages 
to design and analyse complex systems. These languages, which consist of several different individual 
diagram types, include Structured Analysis and Design (SA/SD), Integrated Definitions (IDEF) and the 
Object-Oriented Method (OOM). Recently collective efforts have been made to unify diverse modelling 
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methods and produced the Unified Modeling Language (UML) for software engineering (OMG 2009) and the 
Systems Modeling Language (SysML) for broader domains including hardware, software, information, 
processes, personnel and facilities (OMG 2008). 
Many researchers, meanwhile, have tried to categorise a broad range of modelling methods using 
various criteria: data, function, network, people, time and motivation (Zachman 1987); vision, process, 
structure and behaviour (Eriksson and Penker 2000); organisation, data, control, function and product/service 
(Davis 2008). Although these categorisations are helpful in roughly grouping various diagram types, they are 
too broad or general to be readily helpful for healthcare workers to tell the difference between modelling 
methods. In order to assist healthcare workers understand more specific distinctions between modelling 
methods and recognise the need for them (beyond flowcharts), this study developed a characterisation 
framework of systems modelling methods, which is presented in the next section. 
3.2. Development of a characterisation framework of systems modelling methods 
Analysing various modelling methods used across the disciplines, we found two things. First, the majority of 
modelling methods used in different disciplines differ essentially only in their names, representing identical 
aspects of a system with only some minor variations, e.g. different shape of boxes or arrows, etc. Second, the 
modelling languages developed in software and systems engineering cover most of the modelling methods 
used in other disciplines. Therefore we decided to develop a characterisation framework based on the 
modelling languages developed in software and systems engineering. 
The meta-model analysis was carried out to investigate what the nodes and links of such modelling 
methods primarily represent. Three different primary types of nodes (boxes or circles) and links (connecting 
lines between nodes) were identified as shown in Figure 1: activities, stakeholders and information/material 
for nodes, and hierarchy, sequence and information for links. Each diagram type utilises these nodes and links 
in different ways to represent different aspects of a system.  
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INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
As a result of the meta-model analysis, we identified ten diagram types with distinctive features in 
terms of their nodes and links and their main functions as summarised in Table 1. The first three diagram 
types (stakeholder diagrams, information diagrams and process content diagrams) show hierarchical 
links between stakeholders, information and activities, respectively. The second three diagram types 
(flowcharts, swim lane activity diagrams and state transition diagrams) address some limitations of the 
static nature of the hierarchical-link diagrams by showing sequential links of activities or states. The last four 
diagram types describe information inputs and outputs between stakeholders (communication diagrams, 
sequence diagrams) and activities (data flow diagrams and IDEF0). 
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
In order to show healthcare workers primary differences of these ten diagram types in a clear manner, 
we have developed a framework with three axes (activity, stakeholder and information views) and three 
concentric circles (hierarchical, sequential and information links) and mapped each of the ten diagrams onto it 
as shown in Figure 2. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
The diagram types positioned on one axis explicitly represent a single modelling view with the other 
two views absent or implicit, whereas the diagram types positioned between two axes explicitly represent the 
two views at the same time. For example, flowcharts, state transition diagrams and process content 
diagrams are all located on the activity axis; these diagrams explicitly represent only activity. On the other 
hand, data flow diagrams and IDEF0, which are located between the activity and information axes, explicitly 
represent both activity and information at the same time. 
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3.3. Systems models of a prostate cancer diagnosis process 
The ten different diagram types were used to describe each of the three care scenarios. The following figures 
show ten simplified system models describing, for example, a prostate cancer diagnosis process. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 5 AROUND HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 6 AROUND HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 7 AROUND HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 8 AROUND HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 9 AROUND HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 10 AROUND HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 11 AROUND HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 12 AROUND HERE 
3.4. Evaluation results  
The overall evaluation results across the three case studies were firstly compared using mixed ANOVA to test 
the effects of the case study on response patterns. The five (3×10) mixed ANOVA (case study×diagram types) 
for each statement revealed a non-significant effect of the type of case study on the response patterns 
(Statement I: F(2,26) = 2.49, p=0.10, Statement II: F(2,25) = 0.96, p=0.40, Statement III: F(2,15) = 2.6, 
p=0.11, Statement IV: F(2,15) = 2.3, p=0.14, Statement V: F(2,15) = 0.48, p=0.63). It meant that the response 
patterns across the three case studies were sufficiently similar to be collectively analysed. 
Table 2 summarises the percentage agreement to each of the five statements – i.e. how many percent 
of the participants agreed to the statements. The diagram types are marked with three different sizes of circles 
according to the percentage agreement: big circles for more than 70 percent (inclusive) agreement; small 
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circles for less than 50 percent agreement; medium-sized circles for between 50 (inclusive) and 70 percent 
agreement. 
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
In summary, the largest number of the participants agreed that flowcharts were easy to understand and 
were helpful in understanding care processes and analysing task-related hazards. However, the potential utility 
of the other diagram types was also identified. The participants’ prior experience with different diagram types 
and detailed findings of the participants’ response patterns to each of the five statements now follow. 
3.4.1. Participants’ experience with the diagram types and their job types  
The participants’ previous experience with the five groups of diagram types, captured at the beginning of the 
diagram evaluation, is summarised in Table 3. Overall, the second group (either flowcharts or swim lane 
activity diagrams) had been previously experienced by the largest number of the participants (76%) whereas 
state transition diagrams and the four diagram types with information links (, , , ) had been previously 
experienced by the least (14∼21%). 
INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
 
The participants with different job types had different levels of prior experience with the diagrams. 
Table 3 also shows that the clinical staff who participated in this study have much less experience with any 
type of the diagrams than the healthcare managers and researchers. In particular, none of the clinical staff had 
previous experience with the information-link diagrams (, , , ). 
3.4.2. Ease of understanding (Statement I) 
In general, the diagrams having hierarchical links (, , ) and sequential links (, , ) were rated more 
‘easily understandable’ than the diagrams with information links (, , , ). Table 2 shows that 
approximately 80 percent of the participants responded positively (either agree or strongly agree) to ‘the ease 
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of understanding’ of the diagrams with hierarchical links. Flowcharts, which have been extensively used in 
healthcare, were rated as ‘easily understandable’ by the largest number (97 percent) of the participants. 
The participants’ prior experience generally influenced their perception of the ease of understanding. 
Figure 13 shows the response patterns of two groups: one without any previous experiences with a certain 
diagram type (black bars) and the other with previous experience (white bars). Generally, a greater percentage 
of the participants with previous experience with a certain diagram agreed that the diagram was easy to 
understand than the participants without any experience. The exception was flowcharts; flowcharts were 
perceived to be easy to understand by a slightly greater percentage of inexperienced participants than 
experienced. 
INSERT FIGURE 13 AROUND HERE 
Many participants, however, mentioned that their preference for flowcharts came from their biased  
experience with them. 
“I tend to be swayed toward the flowcharts because I always use them.”       
       By Healthcare Manager/Service Improvement Manager 
 “I still tend to use flowcharts. It is the experience that drives me in that direction. I have considerably less experience 
with any of other methods describing systems.”         
       By Healthcare Researcher/Psychologist 
 
Figure 13 also shows that the gaps of the percentage agreement between the experienced and 
inexperienced participants varied depending on diagram types, i.e. the participants’ prior experience 
influenced their perceived ‘ease of understanding’ of each diagram type to a different degree. Whilst some 
diagram types (, , , ) had relatively small percentage agreement gaps (5∼12%) between the 
experienced and inexperienced participants, some other diagram types (, , , ) had high percentage 
agreement gaps (43∼52%) between the experienced and inexperienced participants. In the case of state 
transition diagrams () and data flow diagrams (), 100% of the participants with prior experience perceived 
them as easily understandable whereas only half of the participants without prior experience perceived them 
as easily understandable. 
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3.4.3. Usefulness – helpful in understanding and communicating how the system works (Statement II) 
In general, the response pattern to Statement II followed the one to Statement I. As Table 2 shows, flowcharts 
remained the most favoured (89%) and the diagrams with information links, particularly communication 
diagrams and sequence diagrams, were again given the lowest percentage agreement for Statement II (39% 
and 29%, respectively). 
Two distinctive changes from the response pattern of Statement I were found. First, the drop of the 
percentage agreement (from Statement I to II) for the hierarchical-link diagrams (≈ 25%) was relatively 
greater than for the other diagram types (≈ 10%). The participants’ comments showed that the hierarchical-
link diagrams were generally perceived to be simple enough to be easily understandable, but too simple to be 
sufficiently informative in understanding how the system works. 
The other distinctive change is that state transition diagrams uniquely gained more positive responses 
(71% for Statement II and 59% for Statement I). State transition diagrams were, therefore, perceived as 
helpful in a general system understanding by the second largest number of the participants in spite of the 
participants’ low (21%) prior experience. 
Many participants commented that state transition diagrams helped them to see care processes in a 
more patient-focused way. As Figure 8 shows, state transition diagrams can represent patient-related states 
and corresponding transition actions and conditions. 
The participants’ following comments on state transition diagrams illustrate the rationale behind their 
positive responses. 
“Quite useful. You picked up a patient in a surgery who you have never seen before, it (state transition diagram) 
provides a quick summary of what should be done and where they should be and it (state transition diagram) is a more 
accessible (understandable) format than flowcharts.”        
       By Clinical Staff/General Practitioner  
“I quite like the fact that it (state transition diagram) follows the patient, and what happens to patients. You can have 
different states of patient and also you can have quite in-depth information underneath what is happening.”  
       By Healthcare Manager/Service Improvement Manager 
 “I think this (state transition diagrams) is the best one. It is patient-led and shows clearly what stage a patient is at. 
State transition diagrams are good for both patients and clinicians.”    
By Healthcare Researcher/Pharmacist 
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3.4.4. Usefulness – in view of specific hazard identification and analysis (Statement III, IV, V) 
The general comments from many participants were that some of the diagrams were helpful in systematically 
identifying hazards – i.e. going through all the elements of a system without missing any out – but the 
diagrams provided very limited information for estimating risk and consequences. The participants generally 
mentioned that consequences of hazards were more likely to be estimated from their individual mental 
models. Nevertheless, different diagram types were perceived as helpful to a different degree in analysing the 
different types of hazards. 
3.4.4.1. Identifying and analysing task-related hazards 
Flowcharts were perceived as most favoured (89 percent agreed) for this purpose, and state transition 
diagrams were the second most favoured (78 percent agreed) as shown in Table 2. The potential of state 
transition diagrams in estimating consequences of risk was illustrated in the following comment. 
“The states in state transition diagrams could be the states of patient harm. Patients have to stay in the previous state, 
if any task fails.”            
       By Healthcare Researcher/Engineer 
3.4.4.2. Identifying and analysing human resource-related hazards 
Table 2 also shows that swim lane activity diagrams, which represent tasks and responsibilities explicitly, 
were the most favoured (83 percent agreed) for this purpose; the participant’s comment below illustrate it as 
well. Flowcharts ranked the second (56 percent agreed) although flowcharts did not show responsibilities 
explicitly. 
“What is really important about healthcare is to understand the interactions between different people and 
responsibilities of different people and it (swim lane activity diagrams) does that.”     
       By Healthcare Researcher/Psychologist 
3.4.4.3. Identifying and analysing  information/material-related hazards 
Table 2 shows that communication diagrams, which explicitly show information/material interactions among 
stakeholders, were the most favoured (72 percent agreed) for this purpose and information diagrams ranked 
the second (67 percent agreed). 
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4. Discussion and conclusions 
4.1 Systems modelling method characterisation 
The diagram characterisation framework developed in this study showed that each diagram type had its own 
unique capability of highlighting different, yet limited, aspects of a complex system; no particular diagram 
explicitly showed all aspects. The characterisation framework effectively helped in comparing the ten 
different diagram types and showed that they evenly covered the representation of different aspects of a 
complex system. They are far from being a comprehensive list of all the diagram types, but the framework 
still provides an effective base for making further comparisons with additional diagram types. 
While this study intentionally identified the ten different diagram types with specific and distinct 
features, there are some other broadly-defined diagram types that represent not all, but multiple types of links 
and nodes. For example, block definition diagrams in the SysML encompass both hierarchical links and 
information links. In addition, nodes in block definition diagrams include stakeholders as well as 
information/material (OMG 2008). Such broad diagram definitions can blur the distinction between diagram 
types and may lead to information overload to users. It remains an open question as to how much complexity 
users can accommodate in conceptual models, but it is apparent from the evaluation results in this study that 
the majority of healthcare users are unlikely to be comfortable with diagrams representing multiple links; the 
majority of the participants were not comfortable even with the diagrams with only information links. 
Conversely, within these ten different diagrams, there are similar types of diagrams in terms of what 
they primarily represent. They have been included separately since each of them presents information in a 
distinct way which can be complementary to the other diagrams. For example, although both communication 
diagrams and sequence diagrams represent information interactions between stakeholders, their different 
layouts emphasise different aspects of a system; communication diagrams underlines how stakeholders are 
connected to each other whereas sequence diagrams highlight the sequence of interactions. 
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4.2 Ease of use and usefulness of the systems modelling methods 
 
The characterisation framework developed in this study enabled the general function of each diagram type to 
be understood. Further study through the diagram evaluation with potential healthcare users investigated the 
healthcare-specific applicability of each diagram. The participants’ prior experience with certain diagram 
types generally influenced how they perceived the ‘ease of use’ (‘ease of understanding’ in this study). As the 
adapted Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) in Figure 14 suggests (Venkatesh 2000), prior to direct 
experience with a certain specific modelling method, individuals are expected to anchor their perceived ‘ease 
of use’ of the new specific modelling method to their general belief regarding modelling methods. Hence, 
individuals are expected to adjust their method-specific perceived ‘ease of use’ to reflect their experience of 
using the method. 
INSERT FIGURE 14 AROUND HERE 
 
This study found, however, that the participants’ prior experience with certain diagrams influenced 
their perceived ‘ease of use’ to a different degree towards each diagram. This may suggest that some diagram 
types can be adopted with less effort by either experienced or inexperienced users, while some other diagram 
types can be more difficult to adopt, particularly by the healthcare users without prior experience. Hence, in 
spite of the unique ‘usefulness’ that particular diagram types might provide, they may be difficult to be 
adopted by a wide range of healthcare users. 
Different professional groups in healthcare, e.g. clinicians, healthcare managers and healthcare 
researchers, were found to have different levels of previous experience with the diagram types. In particular, a 
limited awareness of general systems modelling methods was particularly acute in the clinical staff participant 
group; only 57% of the clinical staff reported that they had used any kind of systems modelling methods 
before. This might suggest that there is a need to increase awareness about the benefits of general modelling 
approaches with clinical staff before providing particular support for using specific methods. 
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Overall, the response pattern to the perceived ‘usefulness’ followed that of the perceived ‘ease of 
understanding’. The Technology Acceptance Model in Figure 14 also posits that perceived ‘usefulness’ will 
be influenced by perceived ‘ease of use’. The participants in this study, though, commented more specifically 
that each of the ten different diagram types has its own specific ‘usefulness’ for understanding different 
aspects of a system. Table 4 summarises the applicability of each modelling method based on the participants’ 
responses. For example, state transition diagrams along with flowcharts can be highly applicable to 
representing patient journeys. State transition diagrams, in particular, were found in this study to provide very 
quick, accessible, patient-led views, which have been known to be crucial for good quality care (Kizer 2002, 
Smith 2006). Process content diagrams, which can facilitate very detailed descriptions of tasks, can be highly 
applicable to representing individual tasks. When it comes to representing roles and responsibilities, or 
communication, it was apparent from meta-model analysis that swim lane activity diagrams are highly 
applicable to representing collaboration, and communication and sequence diagrams to representing 
communication. Data flow diagrams, which facilitate descriptions of data flow, storage and processing, would 
be highly applicable to representing human-technology interactions as Redmill applied (1999). IDEF0, which 
explicitly describes inputs and outputs of activities, can be highly applicable to describing supply chains like 
medication flows.  
INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
 
In conclusion, it is apparent that better use of systems modelling methods may offer great benefits to 
healthcare, when considering the different advantages each method can offer and the complexity and diversity 
of the healthcare systems. However, the different modelling experience levels of healthcare workers suggest 
that different levels of modelling support might be required for different professions. In the case of clinical 
staff, who has relatively limited modelling experience, increased awareness of modelling methods might be 
more important. For the healthcare managers and researchers, where more than 80% have used one or more of 
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the systems modelling methods, might benefit more from experiencing a wide range of diagram types. 
Technical difficulties might be encountered in assisting healthcare managers and researchers to make 
healthcare-specific applications of a wide range of diagram types, e.g. how to define a patient’s states for state 
transition diagrams. Clear guidelines or computer-support for healthcare-specific diagramming could reduce 
barriers in generating and understanding such diagram types. 
Although more research is needed to empirically examine the ‘ease of use’ and ‘usefulness’ in wider 
healthcare contexts with a large number of users, this study provided valuable insights into how healthcare 
can make a better use of systems modelling approaches in support of the design of safe healthcare delivery. 
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 Table 1. Node-link based diagram characterisation and simple examples (extended from (Jun et al. 2009)). 
 
Diagram type Nodes Links Main functions 
 Stakeholder 
diagrams 
Stakeholder  consists of
has types of
Hierarchy
 
Hierarchically structure of 
stakeholders 
 Information 
diagrams 
Information
(document)
content  
consists of
has types of
Hierarchy
 
Hierarchical structure of 
documents or information 
 Process content 
diagrams 
Activity  consists of
has types of
Hierarchy
 
Hierarchical list of 
activities 
 Flowcharts 
Start/end
Decision
Activity  
Sequence
 
Sequential order of 
activities 
 Swim lane 
activity diagrams 
Stakeholder
Start/end
Decision
Activity
 
Sequence
 
Sequential order of 
activities with a clear role 
definition 
 State transition 
diagrams 
State  conditionaction
Sequence
 
Change of a system state 
over time 
 Communication       
    diagrams 
Stakeholder  
Information
/material  
Information/material 
interactions between 
stakeholders 
 Sequence 
     diagrams 
Stakeholder  
Information
/material  
Order of 
information/material 
interactions between 
stakeholders 
 Data flow  
     diagrams 
Activity
Data
storage  
Information
/material  
Information-processing 
activities and information 
storage 
 IDEF0 Activity  
Input/output
control
resource  
Information/material inputs 
and outputs between  
activities and related 
resources and controls 
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Table 2. Percentage agreement for each statement (extended from (Jun et al. 2009)). 
: agreement ≥ 70%, : 70% > agreement ≥ 50%. : agreement < 50% 
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ri
te
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 Stakeholder 
diagrams 
 Information 
diagrams 
 Process content 
diagrams 
 Flowcharts 
 Swim lane 
activity diagrams 
 State transition 
diagrams 
 Communication 
diagrams 
 Sequence 
diagrams 
 Data flow 
diagrams 
 IDEF0 
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Table 3. Percentage of participants experienced with the five groups of diagrams and their job types. 
: ≥ 70%, : 70% > and ≥ 40%. : < 40% 
Diagram type 
 
 
 
 
 
Job type 
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
 S
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
 D
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w
 d
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s 

 ID
EF
0 
A
ny
 o
f  
th
e 
te
n 
di
ag
ra
m
s 
Clinical staff (n=7)  
(29%) 
 
(57%) 
 
(14%) 
 
(0%) 
 
(0%) 
 
(57%) 
Healthcare 
managers (n=15) 
 
(47%) 
 
(73%) 
 
(20%) 
 
(20%) 
 
(33%) 
 
(80%) 
Healthcare 
researchers (n=7) 
 
(71%) 
 
(100%) 
 
(29%) 
 
(14%) 
 
(14%) 
 
(100%) 
Overall (n=29)  
(48%) 
 
(76%) 
 
(21%) 
 
(14%) 
 
(21%) 
 
(79%) 
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Table 4. Applicability of the different diagram types (: applicable, : highly applicable) 
Diagram type 
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10
. I
D
EF
0 
Process and procedure 
e.g. patient journey           
Individual tasks 
e.g. self-medication           
Roles and responsibilities 
e.g. multi disciplinary team           
Communication  
e.g. referral flows           
Human-technology interface 
e.g. use of medical devices           
Procurement and supply 
e.g. medication flows           
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Nodes
Nodes
- Stakeholders
- Activities
- Information
   /material
- Hierarchical links
- Sequential links
- Information links
Links
 
 
Figure 1. What nodes and links represent 
 
 
Activity
view
Stakeholder
view
Information
/material
view
Sequential
linkInformation
link
Hierarchical
link
1. stakeholder
diagram
2. information
diagram
3. process
    content
    diagram
9. data flow
 diagram
4. flowchart
5. swim lane
activity
 diagram
7. communication
diagram
6. state
    transition
    diagram
8. sequence
 diagram
10. IDEF0
 
 
Figure 2. A framework for systems modelling method characterisation 
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oncologist
consists of
has types of
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Figure 3. Stakeholder diagram of a prostate cancer diagnostic process 
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Figure 4. Information diagram of a prostate cancer diagnostic process 
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Diagnosis in urology department
2. TRUSP
and biopsy
3. Tissue
sample test
5 Bone scan/MRI
4. Multidisciplinary team meeting1. Diagnosis in prostate cancer clinic
- Specialist nurse examines patient
- Specialist nurse requests biopsy
- MDT discusses needs for
  bone scan/MRI
- MDT decides treatment options
- Nurse specialist request bone scan
- Radiology dept. does bone scanning
- Radiology dept. reports the resultsTRUSP: Trans-rectal Ultrasound of Prostate
MDT: Multidisciplinary Team
MRI: Magnetic Resonance Imaging
consists of consists of
has types of
activity
KEY
 
 
Figure 5. Process content diagram of a prostate cancer diagnostic process 
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results
Registrar does TRUSP & biopsy
MDT reviews pt's test results
more test?
Radiology does
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MDT decides possible
treatment options
treatment
not needed
needed
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Start / End
Decision point
Process
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KEY
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TRUSP & biopsy
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TRUSP: Trans-rectal Ultrasound of Prostate
MDT: Multidisciplinary Team
MRI: Magnetic Resonance Imaging  
 
Figure 6. Flowcharts of a prostate cancer diagnostic process 
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Figure 7. Swim lane activity diagram of a prostate cancer diagnostic process 
 
Patient examined in diagnostic clinic
Patient with test results
Patient at radiology dept.
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treatment options
- Radiologist does bone scan / MRI
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               Ultrasound
               of Prostate
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Team
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Transition condition
- Transition action
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Figure 8. State transition diagram of a prostate cancer diagnostic process 
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Figure 9. Communication diagram of a prostate cancer diagnostic process 
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Figure 10. Sequence diagram of a prostate cancer diagnostic process 
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Figure 11. Data flow diagram of a prostate cancer diagnostic process 
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Figure 12. IDEF0 of a prostate cancer diagnostic process 
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Figure 13. Participants’ previous experience with a certain diagram type and their percentage agreement to the 
‘ease of understanding’ of the diagram 
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Figure 14. Theoretical framework for the determinants of perceived ‘ease of use’ (adapted from (Venkatesh 
2000)) 
